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1 Introduction
The theory of implicit contracts starts from the premise that the labour market is far from
being a spot market but, on the contrary, workers and firms usually display the tendency to
be involved in long-lasting and non-anonymous relationships (cf. Okun, 1981). Consequently,
if there is some kind of uncertainty about actual production outcomes and entrepreneurs are
more risk-prone than workers, then it may happen that the two parties will consensually rely on
informal agreements on labour provisions and wage payments that optimally share the burden
of realized labour income fluctuations (cf. Baily, 1974; Gordon, 1974; Azariadis, 1975).
The theoretical literature on implicit contracts collects a number of contributions in which
labour market outcomes are determined in a time-less perspective (e.g. Geanakoplos and Ito,
1982; Azariadis and Stiglitz, 1983; Bull, 1983, 1987; Chiari, 1983; Baker et al. 1997). In more
recent years, however, after the seminal work by Haltiwanger and Maccini (1985) in which the
existence of implicit contracts may lead firms to rely on temporary layoffs and recalls, some
authors put some effort to exploring the dynamic consequences on hours, (un)employment and
wages triggered by the existence of optimal risk-sharing in labour contracts.
For instance, Robinson (1999) exploits the theory of repeated games to provide a dynamic
model of strikes in which work litigations are used by employed workers as punishment mecha-
nisms to enforce implicit contracts under asymmetric information. Gu¨rtler (2006) compares
repeated games of implicit contracts with infinite and finite horizon by stressing the impor-
tance of discounting for the compliance with the agreements established between workers and
firms. Calme`s (2007) develops a dynamic implicit-contract model in which firms maximize their
profitspro-fits by taking into account the evolution of the expected utility of their workers. More
recently, Wang (2015) explores how the wage dynamics implied by long-term employment re-
lationships may be helpful in mitigating the adverse effects of financial shocks.
In this paper, we aim at contributing to the literature on dynamic implicit-contract models
by deriving the smooth out-of-equilibrium dynamics of working hours and wages in a theoretical
setting where workers and firms have agreed upon a self-enforcing implicit contract that seeks to
smooth real consumption in a long-run perspective (cf. Romer, 2019, Chapter 11). Specifically,
we develop a theoretical framework in which a representative firm inter-temporally sets its
optimal level of labour utilization by taking into account that workers’ earnings tends to adjust
in the direction of a fixed level quoted in the contract that is assumed to coincide with long-run
consumption (cf. Abowd and Card, 1987).
Our theoretical exploration is split up in two parts. First, we explore the disequilibrium
adjustments of hours and wages in a model economy with no uncertainty in labour productivity.
Thereafter, we consider the optimal trajectories of hours and wages by assuming that the
effectiveness of labour is hit by random shocks that systematically alter the profitability of the
firm. The former case allows us to discuss the conditions under which the suggested contractual
agreement between the firm and its workers conveys meaningful solutions. The latter provides
the basis to assessing the cyclical properties of a dynamic implicit-contract economy.
Overall, our analysis provides a number of interesting findings. On the one hand, depending
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on selected parameter values, the deterministic model may have one, two or no stationary
solution. Interestingly, whenever there are two steady-state allocations for hours and wages the
resting points of the economy without uncertainty can be ordered according to the preferences
of each party. Moreover, in the two-solution case, the local dynamics of the model reveals that
wages display the tendency to move in the opposite direction with respect to working hours by
converging towards the allocation preferred by the firm and loathed by its workers. This result
is consistent with the empirical tests of the implicit contract theory carried out in the US at the
micro level by Beaudry and DiNardo (1995); indeed, in their pioneering study - controlling for
labour productivity - higher wages appear associated with lower hour provision and vice versa.
In addition, when the initial contract wage overshoots (undershoots) its long-equilibrium value,
workers’ earnings remain above (below) the contract fixed level during the whole adjustment
process.
In the other hand, simulations of the stochastic model run by targeting the observed
volatilityvo-la-ti-li-ty of output show that productivity disturbances does not overturn the
counter-cyclical pattern of wages. Moreover, we show that the insurance scheme underlying
the dynamic implicit contract displays the tendency to underestimate the volatility of labour
earnings but it has the potential to explain the degree of real-wage stickiness usually observed
in macro data (cf. Ravn and Simonelli, 2007).
This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical setting. Section 3
analyses the deterministic economy. Section 4 analyzes the stochastic economy with uncertainty
in the effectiveness of labour. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical setting
We consider a model economy in which time is continuous and a representative risk-neutral
firm deals with a group of risk-averse identical workers that cannot purchase insurance against
fluctuations in the level of their long-run labour income. Within this environment, given the
different attitude towards risk, we make the hypothesis that the firm and its workers have
implicitly agreed upon a self-enforcing wage contract that seeks to stabilize the level of long-
run labour earnings. Assuming the absence of non-labour incomes and savings on the side of
workers, this means that the informal - but binding - agreement between the workers and the
firm will tend to stabilize real consumption in a long-run perspective (cf. Abowd and Card,
1987).
On the productive side - similarly to Guerrazzi (2011, 2016) - we assume that the represen-
tative firm is endowed with a quadratic production function so that instantaneous output Y (t)
is equal to
Y (t) = A (t)L (t)− 1
2
(L (t))2 (1)
where A (t) > 0 is a technology variable taken as given by the firm and its workers whereas
L (t) is the labour provision of the workers attached to the firm measured in hours.
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The variable A (t) in eq. (1) affects the marginal productivity of employed workers and it
conveys the actual realization of the state of the world. Specifically, the higher (lower) the
value of A (t), the higher (lower) the marginal productivity of employed workers and the better
(worse) the realized state of the world. In the remainder of the paper, we assume that A (t)
might move over time according to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (cf. Cox and Miller, 1967).
Formally speaking, this means that
·
A (t) = κ (µA − A (t)) + σA ·x (t) (2)
where µA > 0 is the long-run mean of the process, κ > 0 is its speed of mean reversion, σA > 0
is its instantaneous standard deviation whereas
·
x (t) is a standard Brownian motion with zero
drift and unit variance.
As implied by the text-book treatment of the implicit contract theory offered by Romer
(2019, Chapter 11), in a time-less contracting model with stochastic productivity, the fixed
level of consumption granted to workers in all the states of the world can be conveyed as a non-
linear combination of the possible realizations of productivity shocks whose weights are affected
by workers preferences, the available productive technology and the probability distribution of
the already mentioned productivity shocks.1 Consequently, under the assumption that agents
are rational and the information on these fundamental factors is costlessly available to all the
involved parties of the contract, such a critical level of consumption can be taken as exogenously
given without any loss of generality.
Along these lines, in what follows we will assume that the long-run consumption granted to
employed workers who have agreed upon the dynamic implicit contract is fixed at the constant
level C > 0. Thereafter, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of the contract real wage w (t) aimed
at equalizing in the long-run the wage bill to C will be given by
·
w (t) = θ
(
C
L (t)
− w (t)
)
(3)
where θ > 0 is a measure of the attrition between the actual and the long-run real wage that
stabilizes consumption.
The expression in eq. (3) implies that in each instant the contract wage increases (decreases)
whenever it is below (above) the long-run consumption per unit of hours.2 Such a differential
equation is not affected by the evolution of A (t) in order to capture the idea that the wage
contract is not renegotiated when the state of the world changes. Furthermore, the parameter
θ in the RHS of eq. (3) can be taken as a measure of the degree of aversion with respect to
situations of under- or overconsumption; indeed, for any given level of L, the higher (lower) the
value of θ, the faster w adjusts itself in the direction of C.
1A formal proof for this statement is sketched in Appendix.
2As we show in Appendix, assuming that the real wage increases (decreases) when labour earnings are below
(above) the long-run level of consumption quoted in the contract complicates the analytical treatment of the
model without any substantial modification in the conclusions achieved throughout the paper.
4
Following the game-theoretical arguments put forward by Bull (1987), the wage trajectory
implied by eq. (3) can be thought as the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of a post-hiring trading
game whose self-enforceability is supported by intra-firm reputation. In other words, if workers
provide the required amount of hours and the firm deviates from the wage trajectory conveyed
by eq. (3), then it will be punished its employees with shirking (or strikes) and it will signal
itself as a cheater by preventing the formation of mutually profitable long-lasting relationships
in future periods. Consequently, after the agreement has been achieved, no party is assumed
to have incentive to renege (cf. Thomas and Worrall, 1988).
3 The deterministic economy
We begin our analysis by considering what happens in model economy without uncertainty so
that the state of the world is revealed to the firm and its workers and is assumed to remain
constant over time. Specifically, we initially assume that
A(t) = A > 0 for all t (4)
In each instant, given the values of C, θ, and A, the inter-temporal problem of the repre-
sentative firm in the model economy described above is to set the optimal labour input aiming
at maximizing its profits by tacking into account that the real wage adjusts according to the
differential equation in (3). Formally speaking, taking into account the production function in
eq. (1) and the simplifying assumption in (4), the problem of the representative firm is the
following:
max
{L(t)}∞t=0
∞∫
t=0
exp (−ρt) (AL (t)− 1
2
(L (t))2 − w (t)L (t)) dt
s.to
·
w (t) = θ
(
C
L(t)
− w (t)
)
w (0) = w0
(5)
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate of entrepreneurs whereas w0 > 0 is the initial level of the real
wage rate quoted on the contract.
The first-order conditions (FOCs) of the problem in (5) can be written as
A− L (t)− w (t)− θC Λ (t)
(L (t))2
= 0 (6)
·
Λ (t) = (ρ+ θ) Λ (t) + L (t) (7)
lim
t→∞
Λ (t)w (t) = 0 (8)
where Λ (t) is the costate variable associated to w (t).
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Eq. (6) is the FOC with respect to the control variable of the firm, that is, L (t). Moreover,
the differential equation in (7) describes the optimal path of Λ(t), whereas (8) is the required
transversality condition.
After a trivial manipulation, the results in eq.s (6) and (7) allow us to obtaining the following
differential equation for the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of working hours:
·
L (t) =
(ρ+ θ)L (t) (A− L (t)− w (t)) + θ (2C − w (t)L (t))
2 (A− L (t)− w (t))− L (t) (9)
Starting from given initial conditions to be defined, the differential equations in (3) and (9)
describe how hours of work and wages move over time once an everlasting state of the world is
revealed to the firm and its workers. Consequently, eq.s. (3) and (9) convey the dynamics of
wages and hours for a given level of labour productivity.
3.1 Steady-state equilibria
Within the model under investigation, steady-state equilibria are defined as the set of pairs
{L∗, w∗} such that
·
L (t) =
·
w (t) = 0. Obviously, the elements of that set are given by allocations
in which the real wage bill equals the fixed level of consumption fixed by the implicit contract
on which the firm and its workers agreed upon.
From a formal point of view, the derivation of {L∗, w∗} is straightforward. First, setting
·
w (t) = 0 in eq. (3) leads to
w∗ =
C
L∗
(10)
Thereafter, setting
·
L (t) = 0 in eq. (9) and plugging the result into eq. (10) leads to the
following quadratic expression:
(L∗)2 − AL∗ + Cρ
ρ+ θ
= 0 (11)
The parabola in eq. (11) allows to state the following three plain propositions:
Proposition 1: When A = 2
√
Cρ/ (ρ+ θ), there is only one stationary solution given by
L∗0 ≡ A/2 and w∗0 ≡ 2C/A.
Proposition 2: When A > 2
√
Cρ/ (ρ+ θ), there are two distinct stationary solutions
given by L∗1 ≡ 1/2
(
A−√A2 − 4Cρ/ (ρ+ θ)) and w∗1 ≡ 2C/(A−√A2 − 4Cρ/ (ρ+ θ)) as
well as L∗2 ≡ 1/2
(
A+
√
A2 − 4Cρ/ (ρ+ θ)
)
and w∗2 ≡ 2C/
(
A+
√
A2 − 4Cρ/ (ρ+ θ)
)
.
Proposition 3: When A < 2
√
Cρ/ (ρ+ θ), there are no (real) stationary solutions.
Proposition 1 provides the parameters’ combination under which there is a unique steady-
state (L∗0, w
∗
0). In that allocation, equilibrium hours are an increasing function of the parameter
that conveys the actual state of the world, whereas the equilibrium wage increases (decreases)
with the fixed level of consumption granted by the implicit contract (the realized state of the
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world) virtually signed by the firm and its employees.3 This pattern clearly points out the
insurance component of the implicit contract under which workers tend to work more (less) for
less (more) in good (bad) states.
By contrast, Proposition 2 reveals the condition under which - similarly to what happens in
the dynamic model with multiple equilibria by Diamond (1985) - there are two different steady-
states, that is, (L∗1, w
∗
1) and (L
∗
2, w
∗
2).
4 Assuming separability between leisure and consumption
in the utility function of workers, the two stationary solutions pointed out in Proposition 2 can
be ordered according to the preferences of the involved economic agents. Specifically, since the
implied level of consumption - or the implied labour earnings - is the same in both allocations,
(L∗1, w
∗
1), that is, the stationary solution with low equilibrium hours and high equilibrium wage,
is the most preferred by workers because it implies more leisure, whereas (L∗2, w
∗
2), that is, the
stationary solution with high equilibrium hours and low equilibrium wage, is most the preferred
by the firm because - everything else being equal - it implies higher profits.
Furthermore, Proposition 3 shows the condition under which a steady-state does not exist.
For a given value of the state of the world conveyed by A, the impossibility to retrieving a
stationary solution for the dynamics of working hours and wages appears alternatively related
to an excessive degree of impatience on the side of the firms mirrored in the value taken by ρ,
to an excessive fixed level of long-run consumption granted to workers embodied in the actual
level of C or to a mild rate of mean reversion of contract wages conveyed by the value of θ.
Overall, this proposition suggests that in our dynamic implicit-contract model the existence of a
stationary solution requires appropriate levels of labour effectiveness and risk-aversion together
with not exorbitant discount rates and insured long-run levels of labour income.
The latter result on discounting recalls the one achieved by Gu¨rtler (2006) in a repeated-
game setting where higher values of the discount rate yield a decrease in the future value of
firm’s profits. Consequently, it becomes less worthwhile for the firm to honor the implicit
agreement achieved with its workers since the punishment for reneging decreases and in that
case the firm may find profitable to withdraw from the contract.
3.2 Local dynamics
Given the stationary solution {L∗, w∗}, the local dynamics of working hours and wages is
described by the following 2× 2 linear system:
( ·
L (t)
·
w (t)
)
=
[
j1,1 j1,2
− θC
(L∗)2
−θ
](
L (t)− L∗
w (t)− w∗
)
(12)
3It is worth noticing that the unique stationary solution falls in the concave part of the production function
in eq. (1).
4Obviously, for (L∗
1
, w∗
1
) to be feasible it must hold that A >
√
A2 − 4Cρ/ (ρ+ θ). In the remainder of the
paper, we will assume that when the condition pointed out by Proposition 2 is met such an inequality is always
fulfilled.
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where j1,1 ≡ ∂
·
L (t) /∂L (t)
∣∣∣∣
L(t)=L∗,w(t)=w∗
and j1,2 ≡ ∂
·
L (t) /∂w (t)
∣∣∣∣
L(t)=L∗,w(t)=w∗
.
In general terms, the two unspecified elements on the first row of the Jacobian matrix in
(12) can be written as
j1,1 =
(
(ρ+ θ) Φ (L∗)− θC
L∗
)
(2Γ (L∗)− L∗) + 3 ((ρ+ θ) (AL∗ − (L∗)2 − C)+ θC)
(2Γ (L∗)− L∗)2 (13)
j1,2 =
2
(
(ρ+ θ)
(
AL∗ − (L∗)2 − C)+ θC)− (ρ+ 2θ)L∗ (2Γ (L∗)− L∗)
(2Γ (L∗)− L∗)2 (14)
where Φ (L∗) ≡ (AL∗ − 2 (L∗)2 − C) /L∗ and Γ (L∗) ≡ (AL∗ − (L∗)2 − C) /L∗.
Under the condition pointed out in Proposition 1, that is, when there is only one stationary
solution given by (L∗0, w
∗
0), the Jacobian matrix of the system in (12) merely reduces to[
ρ+ θ ρ
− θ(θ+ρ)
ρ
−θ
]
(15)
The trace of the matrix in (15) is equal to ρ whereas its determinant is equal to zero. This
means that one eigenvalue of the system is zero whereas the other is equal to ρ. Consequently,
when the parameters of the model deliver a unique stationary solution, the out-of-equilibrium
dynamics of hours and wages cannot be assessed; indeed, this characterization represents a
degenerate case in which convergence towards the stationary solution is possible only if time
flows in reverse (cf. Lesovik et al. 2019). From an economic point of view, this result can be
rationalized by arguing that when there is only one stationary solution the agreement between
the firm and the workers - described by the problem in (5) - becomes pointless. In fact, when
there is only one resting point in the system of eq.s (3) and (9), the insurance mechanism
provided by the implicit contract is undermined. Despite the constancy of labour effectiveness,
the implementation of the agreement between the firms and its workers requires at least the
existence of multiple equilibria. Therefore, when the condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium
is met, the solution of the firm problem is not able to pin down a meaningful out-of-equilibrium
dynamics for hours and wages.
Under the condition pointed out by Proposition 2, that is, when there are two distinct
stationary solutions given by (L∗1, w
∗
1) and (L
∗
2, w
∗
2), analytical results are difficult to be derived.
Fixing the value of ρ and relying on a computational software, however, it becomes possible
to assess - for different values of A, θ and C - the magnitude of the eigenvalues associated to
the Jacobian matrix in (12) - say r1 and r2 - for each implied stationary solution.
5 Specifically,
setting the value of the discount rate as in Alvarez and Shimer (2011), some sets of numerical
5All the MATLAB codes used throughout the paper are available from the authors upon request.
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solutions are collected in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
A L∗1 w
∗
1 r1 (L
∗
1, w
∗
1) r2 (L
∗
1, w
∗
1) L
∗
2 w
∗
2 r1 (L
∗
2, w
∗
2) r2 (L
∗
2, w
∗
2)
1.3 0.351 2.845 0.025 + 0.039i 0.025− 0.039i 0.948 1.054 0.091 −0.041
1.4 0.304 3.287 0.025 + 0.043i 0.0250− 0.043i 1.095 0.912 0.100 −0.050
1.5 0.271 3.686 0.025 + 0.046i 0.025− 0.046i 1.228 0.813 0.107 −0.057
1.6 0.246 4.061 0.025 + 0.048i 0.025− 0.048i 1.353 0.738 0.112 −0.062
1.7 0.226 4.421 0.025 + 0.049i 0.025− 0.049i 1.473 0.678 0.117 −0.067
Table 1: Numerical solutions for different values of A (ρ = 0.05, θ = 0.10, C = 1)
θ L∗1 w
∗
1 r1 (L
∗
1, w
∗
1) r2 (L
∗
1, w
∗
1) L
∗
2 w
∗
2 r1 (L
∗
2, w
∗
2) r2 (L
∗
2, w
∗
2)
0.08 0.328 3.046 0.025 + 0.039i 0.025− 0.039i 1.171 0.853 0.092 −0.042
0.09 0.296 3.368 0.025 + 0.042i 0.025− 0.042i 1.203 0.831 0.100 −0.050
0.10 0.271 3.686 0.025 + 0.046i 0.025− 0.046i 1.228 0.813 0.107 −0.057
0.11 0.250 4 0.025 + 0.049i 0.025− 0.049i 1.250 0.800 0.115 −0.065
0.12 0.231 4.311 0.025 + 0.052i 0.025− 0.052i 1.268 0.788 0.122 −0.072
Table 2: Numerical solutions for different values of θ (ρ = 0.05, A = 1.5, C = 1)
C L∗1 w
∗
1 r1 (L
∗
1, w
∗
1) r2 (L
∗
1, w
∗
1) L
∗
2 w
∗
2 r1 (L
∗
2, w
∗
2) r2 (L
∗
2, w
∗
2)
0.8 0.206 3.881 0.025 + 0.049i 0.025− 0.049i 1.293 0.618 0.116 −0.066
0.9 0.237 3.787 0.025 + 0.047i 0.025− 0.047i 1.262 0.713 0.112 −0.062
1.0 0.271 3.686 0.025 + 0.046i 0.025− 0.046i 1.228 0.813 0.107 −0.057
1.1 0.307 3.577 0.025 + 0.044i 0.025− 0.044i 1.192 0.922 0.103 −0.053
1.2 0.346 3.459 0.025 + 0.042i 0.025− 0.042i 1.153 1.040 0.098 −0.048
Table 3: Numerical solutions for different values of C (ρ = 0.05, A = 1.5, θ = 0.10)
The numerical results in Tables 1, 2 and 3 can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: When A > 2
√
Cρ/ (ρ+ θ), the stationary solution (L∗1, w
∗
1) defined in
Proposition 2 is an unstable source with complex dynamics whereas (L∗2, w
∗
2) is a saddle point.
Proposition 4 reveals that when the condition for multiple stationary solution is met the
steady-state with low equilibrium hours and high equilibrium wage is unstable whereas the
steady-state with high equilibrium hours and low equilibrium wage is characterized by saddle-
path dynamics. This means that given an initial value for the contract wage - say w(0) = w0 > 0
- there is only one trajectory that satisfies the dynamic system in (12) which converges to
(L∗2, w
∗
2) while all the others diverge. In other words, the equilibrium path towards the steady-
state with high equilibrium hours and low equilibrium wage is locally determinate, that is,
taking the contract value of w0 there is only a unique value of the initial hours - L(0) - in
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the neighbourhood of L∗2 that generates a trajectory converging to (L
∗
2, w
∗
2) whereas all the
others diverge. Strictly speaking, the value of L(0) should be selected in order to verify the
transversality condition in (8) by placing the system in (12) exactly on the stable branch of the
saddle point (L∗2, w
∗
2).
An interesting implication of Proposition 4 is that - unless the system rests in (L∗1, w
∗
1) -
hours and wages tend to converge towards (L∗2, w
∗
2), that is, the allocation preferred by the firm
and opposed by its employees with respect to (L∗1, w
∗
1).
6 Moreover, everything else being equal,
the absolute value of the convergent root (r2) is an increasing function (decreasing) of A and
θ (C). Obviously, this means that high levels of productivity as well as a strong risk-aversion
for under- or overconsumption imply a quick convergence towards (L∗2, w
∗
2). By constrast, high
values of the constant level of consumption granted by the implicit contract delay the process
of convergence.7
Using the baseline calibration indicated in the forth row of Tables 1, 2 and 3 and assuming
that w (0) is 1% below or above w∗2, the saddle path dynamics of hours, wage and their product
- which is assumed to coincide with workers’ consumption stated by the implicit contract - is
illustrated in the two panels of Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Saddle path adjustments of hours, wages and earnings
A = 1.5, ρ = 0.05, θ = 0.10, C = 1
The two diagrams in Figure 1 show that when the starting level of the wage undershoots
(overshoots) its stationary reference by 1% hours overshoot (undershoot) their long-run equi-
librium value by 0.35%, whereas earnings undershoot (overshoot) their fixed contractual value
by 0.65%. Thereafter, consistently with the micro-econometric tests of the implicit contract
theory, wages move counter-cyclically until (L∗2, w
∗
2) is reached. Moreover, given the absence
of savings, the whole adjustment process of hours and wages is characterized by a pattern of
under- or overconsumption depending on the initial value of the contract wage.
6To some extent, A (L∗
2
− L∗
1
)− 1/2
(
(L∗
2
)
2 − (L∗
1
)
2
)
can be taken as a proxy of the equilibrium reward that
the firm receives for its insurance service. In a similar manner, if U(C)−V (L) is the utility function of workers,
then their equilibrium loss amounts to V (L∗
2
)− V (L∗
1
).
7In addition, it would be possible to show that firm’s impatience works against convergence, indeed, the
modulus of r2 results in being a decreasing function of the value of ρ.
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The pattern of hours and wages described above follows in a straightforward manner from
the role played by the wage rate in the model economy under investigation. Indeed, taking into
account the insurance scheme provided to workers by the self-enforcing implicit contract, the
wage does not play any allocative function but it can be thought as a sort of indemnity that
the firm corresponds to its workers with the aim of stabilizing their consumption (cf. Barro,
1977; Hall, 1980). On the side of the firm, large (small) indemnities are profitable only when
productivity of labour is high (low) and this happens when the amount of working hours is
low (high). On the side of workers, given the targeted stability of consumption, higher (lower)
indemnities will be used to buy additional (sell some) leisure - which is assumed to be a normal
good - by leading the insured employees to work for a lower (higher) amount of hours. In other
words, consistently with wage equations run in the US at the micro level by controlling for
labour productivity, higher (lower) wages have only a positive (negative) income effect that
leads workers to work less (more) (cf. Beaudry and Dinardo, 1995).
4 The stochastic economy
Now we deal with the more realistic case in which the variable that conveys the realized state
of the world and the effectiveness of labour is not constant but it follows instead the stochastic
process in eq. (2). In this case, the firm problem becomes the following:
max
{L(t)}∞t=0
E0

 ∞∫
0
exp (−ρt) (A (t)L (t)− 1
2
(L (t))2 − w (t)L (t)) dt


s.to
·
w (t) = θ
(
C
L(t)
− w (t)
)
·
A (t) = κ (µA − A (t)) + σA ·x (t)
w (0) = w0, A (0) = A0
(16)
where E [·] is the expectation operator whereas A0 > 0 is the initial value of the state of the
world.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the firm problem is given by
ρV (A (t) , w (t)) = max
L
{
A (t)L (t)− 1
2
(L (t))2 − w (t)L (t)
+θ
(
C
L(t)
− w (t)
)
∂V (A(t),w(t))
∂w
+ κ (µA − A (t)) ∂V (A(t),w(t))∂A + 12σ2A ∂
2V (A(t),w(t))
∂A2
} (17)
where V (·) is the value function.
The FOC for L(t) requires that along an optimal path it must hold that
∂V (A (t) , w (t))
∂w
=
L (t)2 (A (t)− L (t)− w (t))
Cθ
(18)
Moreover, the envelope condition for w(t) is given by
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(ρ+ θ) ∂V (A(t),w(t))
∂w
=
(
C
L(t)
− w (t)
)
∂2V (A(t),w(t))
∂w2
+κ (µA − A (t)) ∂
2V (A(t),w(t))
∂A∂w
+ 1
2
σ2A
∂3V (A(t),w(t))
∂A2∂w
− L (t)
(19)
Despite the simplicity of the stochastic process used to describe the evolution of labour
effectiveness, analytical results for the dynamics of hours and wages may be difficult to find.
Nevertheless, the solution of the stochastic model can be retrieved by using numerical techniques
aimed at approximating the value function over a given grid (cf. Kushner and Dupuis, 1992).8
4.1 Calibration and simulation results
The stochastic model is simulated in order to match the volatility of the log-deviations of US
GDP from its long-run level as reported by Ravn and Simonelli (2007). In other words, we
calibrate the model with the aim of replicating the volatility of the observed output fluctuations.
To this end, the baseline calibration indicated in the forth row of Tables 1, 2 and 3 is integrated
by calibrating the stochastic process in eq. (2) in the following manner. First, the long-run
mean of the stochastic process that conveys the effectiveness of production (µA) is set at the
same value exploited for the deterministic simulations in Figure 1. Second, the speed of mean
reversion of the effectiveness of production (κ) is fixed at the value of the convergent root of
implied by the baseline calibration of the deterministic model. Moreover, the volatility of the
effectiveness of production (σA) is tuned in order to achieve the targeted value of the standard
deviation of output.9 The whole set of parameters, their description and the respective values
are collected in Table 4.
Parameter Description Value
C Long-run consumption 1.000000
ρ Discount rate 0.050000
θ Attrition of the contract wage 0.100000
µA Long-run productivity 1.500000
κ Attrition of productivity 0.057000
σA Standard deviation of productivity 0.004225
Table 4: Calibration
Given the parameters’ value in Table 4, the theoretical values implied by the model econ-
omy are retrieved by replicating the typical steps followed in business cycles contributions (cf.
Shimer, 2005). Specifically, we first generate 1, 200 theoretical observations. Throwing away
the first 1, 000 in order to mitigate the butterfly effect, we remain with 200 observations that
represent the corresponding quarterly figures of the typical 50-year horizon covered by business
8As we explain in Appendix, a promising method for simulating the dynamic implicit-contract model with
stochastic labour effectiveness is the one grounded on a Markov decision chain approximation.
9The calibration is completed by fixing w0 = 0.81, A0 = 1.51 and setting the time-step of simulation to
0.004.
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cycle analysis. For each variable of interest, we take the standard deviation and the correlation
matrix of the log deviations from the corresponding deterministic long-run reference. There-
after, such a procedure is repeated for 10, 000 times and theoretical values are obtained by
averaging the outcomes of each replication. Defining z as ln z − ln z∗, where z∗ is the stable
stationary solution for the variable z, the simulation results for a set of selected variables are
collected in Table 5 (observed values in parenthesis).
Variable Y wL L w
Standard deviation (%)
1.56
(1.56)
0.57
(1.01)
0.92
(0.51)
0.69
(0.86)
Y 1 0.63
0.94
(0.67)
−0.71
(0.18)
Correlation matrix wL − 1 0.66 −0.04
L − − 1 −0.76
(0.01)
w − − − 1
Table 5: Simulation results
The figures in Table 5 suggest the following broad conclusions. First, the stochastic model
understates the volatility of labour earnings and wages but it overstates the one of working
hours. According to simulated figures, earnings should be the variable with the smaller volatility
while in real data the lowest dispersion around the mean is instead observed for hours. If we
interpret earnings as a measure of consumption, then the figure of volatility is still understated
though to a lower extent; indeed, the observed standard deviation of consumption amounts
to 0.86% which is definitely higher than 0.57%. An explanation for this pattern is that our
theoretical framework does not account for the consumption of unemployed workers which is
usually more volatile than the consumption of the employed ones (cf. Pissarides, 2004).
Second, contrary to what is shown by the deterministic model, the stochastic model displays
a sound degree of real-wage stickiness; indeed, the standard deviation of simulated wages is more
than double with respect to the one of output. In comparison with actual data, however, our
theoretical model tends to exacerbate the cyclical correlation of hours with respect to output.
Moreover, the stochastic model replicates in a strong manner the counter-cyclicality of wages
that also characterizes the saddle-path trajectories of the deterministic model. Obviously, this
means that the insurance scheme implied the dynamics of hours and wages is unable to explain
the mild pro-cyclicality of wages observed at the macro level (cf. Calme`s, 2007). An example
of a typical trajectory of hours, wages and labour earnings is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Stochastic adjustments of hours, wages and earnings
The diagram in Figure 2 clearly shows the pronounced consumption smoothing operated
by the dynamic implicit contract via the dynamics of labour earnings as well as the counter-
cyclical behaviour of wages; indeed, working hours (wages) are always above (below) their stable
long-run references. Such a pattern reveals the existence of a strong amplification mechanism of
productivity shocks inside the stochastic model coming from the rigidity of wages. Although the
negative correlation between hours and wage appear at odds with the available macro evidence,
that kind of dynamic behaviour is a direct consequence of the insurance scheme described above
and is also consistent with the empirical tests of the implicit contract theory carried out with
micro data on hours and wages even outside the US (cf. Bellou and Kaymak, 2012).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we develop a dynamic implicit-contract model grounded on optimal control.
Specifically, we explore the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of working hours and wages in a model
economy where a risk-neutral representative firm and its risk-averse workers have agree upon
a self-enforcing implicit contract that is assumed to smooth long-run labour earnings and con-
sumption. More in detail, we develop a theoretical framework in which the firm inter-temporally
sets its optimal level of labour utilization by taking into account that the implied wage bill tends
to adjusting in the direction of a fixed level that seeks to stabilizing workers’ equilibrium con-
sumption (cf. Romer, 2019, Chapter 11).
Ignoring uncertainty in labour productivity reveals that our theoretical setting may have
one, two or no stationary solution. The out-of-equilibrium dynamics of the deterministic
economyeco-no-my, however, can be assessed only in the two-solution case and it reveals that
wages tend to moving in the opposite direction with respect to working hours by converging
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towards the allocation in which firm’s profit is high and workers’ utility is low. This result cor-
roborates the micro-econometric evidence on the implicit contract theory obtained by regressing
wage on hours by controlling for productivity (cf. Beaudry and DiNardo, 1995). Moreover,
when the initial value of the contract wage falls above (below) its long-run equilibrium value,
the pattern of workers’ consumption is characterized by overconsumption (underconsumption).
Adding uncertainty in labour productivity with the aim of replicating the magnitude of
observed output fluctuations has the potential to miming the real wage stickiness conveyed
by macro data (cf. Ravn and Simonelli, 20017). The insurance mechanism provided by the
dynamic implicit contract, however, understates the volatility of labour earnings and confirms
the counter-cyclicality of wages observed in micro data in a number of countries (cf. Bellou
and Kaymak, 2012).
The failure of the model to predicting a pro-cyclical pattern of wages is easily attributable
to the lack of adjustments on the extensive margin. If positive shocks to the effectiveness
of labour lead the firm to hire workers and the path of contract wages is given, then the
marginal productivity of working hours does not necessarily moves in the same direction of the
effectiveness of labour because not only its vertical intercept, but also its shape will be affected
by the level of employment. Obviously, this may open the door to a positive co-movement of
hours, employment and wages as observed in real macro data. In addition, there is too much
symmetry in the model. For instance, it is quite likely that the firm would be willing to lower
the wages when earning are above long-consumption, but it may be much more reluctant to
raise them when it holds the opposite. This kind of asymmetric behaviour may have important
cyclical consequences both on hours and wages. The implied extensions of the model, however,
are left to further developments.
Appendix: The fixed level of consumption
Consider the production function in eq. (1). For sake of simplicity, suppose that are there only
two states of the world and the economy is static. This means that the productivity parameter
A can take only two values so that it is equal to A1 (A2) with probability p (1− p). Moreover,
assume that workers-consumers are endowed with a utility function separable in consumption
and leisure where both components - in analogy with the production possibilities of the firm -
are given by distinct quadratic expressions. Formally speaking, this amounts to positing that
the utility function of workers can be written as
U (Ci, Li) = ZCi − 1
2
C2i − V Li +
1
2
L2i Z > 0, V > 0, i = 1, 2 (A1)
where Ci is consumption, Li is labour provision measured in hours whereas Z and V are positive
parameters.
In a time-less economy described by the production function in eq. (1) and the preferences
in (A1), the optimal implicit contract that smooths workers’ consumption in all the possible
states of the world is found through the solution of the following problem:
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max
{Ci,Li}i=1,2
p
(
A1L1 − 1
2
L21 − C1
)
+ (1− p)
(
A2L2 − 1
2
L22 − C2
)
(A2)
s.to
p
(
ZC1 − 1
2
C21 − V L1 +
1
2
L21
)
+ (1− p)
(
ZC2 − 1
2
C22 − V L2 +
1
2
L22
)
> u0 (A3)
where u0 is a fixed level of the fallback utility level of workers (cf. Romer, 2019, Chapter 11).
The FOCs of the problem in (A2)− (A3) are given by
−1 + λ (Z − Ci) = 0 i = 1, 2 (A4)
Ai − Li − λ (V − Li) = 0 i = 1, 2 (A5)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the participation constraint in (A3).
The FOCs in (A4) implies that consumption is constant in all the states of the world so
that
Ci = C
∗∗ > 0 i = 1, 2 (A6)
Plugging the FOCs in (A4) into the FOCs in (A5) by taking into account the result in (A6)
leads to
L∗∗i =
Ai (Z − C∗∗)− V
Z − C∗∗ − 1 i = 1, 2 (A7)
The expression in (A7) reveals that - in each state of the world - contract employment is
found by equalizing the marginal productivity of labour to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure pinned down by the fixed level of C. In other words, under
the optimal contract the actual level of employment is given by the intersection of the conven-
tional labour demand schedule and a constrained labour supply in which the possibilities of
substitution between consumption and leisure are bound by the fact that in each state of the
world workers have to consume exactly an amount of goods equal to C∗∗.
Plugging the results in (A6) and (A7) into (A3) reveals that C∗∗ has to be consistent with
the following equation:
ZC∗∗ +
(L∗∗2 )
2 − (C∗∗)2
2
− V L∗2 + p
(
V (Z − C∗∗) (A2 − A1)
Z − C∗∗ − 1 +
(L∗∗1 )
2 − (L∗∗2 )2
2
)
= u0 (A8)
For reasonable values of A1, A2, Z, V , and p, the expression on left-hand-side (LHS) of (A8)
is monotonically decreasing in C. Consequently, as shown in figure A1, given a positive value
of u0 there exists an unique meaningful value of C
∗∗.
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Figure A1: The determination of C∗∗
A1 = 1, A2 = 2, Z = V = 1, p = u0 = 1/2
Appendix: An alternative for the dynamics of contract
wages
A sensible alternative for the real wage dynamics fixed by the contract is the one according to
which the real wage increases (decreases) when the real wage bill is below (above) the long-run
level of consumption. Formally, speaking a sensible alternative for the differential equation in
(3) is given by
·
w (t) = θ (C − w (t)L (t)) (B1)
In this case, the solution of the firm problem in the deterministic economy leads to following
employment dynamics:
·
L (t) =
θ (A− L (t)) (w (t)L (t)− C)− w (t) (Aρ+ L (t) (Aθ − ρ)− θ (L (t))2 − ρw (t))
w (t)
(B2)
The differential equations in (B1) and (B2) imply that steady-state level of hours, that is
L∗, is consistent with a cubic continuous expression defined as
Ψ (L∗) ≡ θ (L∗)3 − (L∗)2 (Aθ − ρ)− AρL∗ + ρC = 0 (B3)
Straightforward differentiation revels that the function Ψ (·) has two critical points given by
L ≡ Aθ − ρ−
√
Aθ (Aθ + ρ) + ρ2
3θ
and L ≡ Aθ − ρ+
√
Aθ (Aθ + ρ) + ρ2
3θ
(B4)
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Since Ψ (0) = ρC and lim
L∗→+∞(−∞)
Ψ(L∗) = +∞ (−∞), L (L) is a maximum (minimum) for
Ψ (·). Consequently, it becomes possible to stating the following propositions:
Proposition B1: When Ψ
(
L
)
= 0,
(
L,C/L
)
is the only stationary solution to the system
of differential equations given by (B1) and (B2).
Proposition B2: When Ψ
(
L
)
< 0, there are two distinct stationary solutions to the
system of differential equations given by (B1) and (B2), namely (L∗1, C/L
∗
1) and (L
∗
2, C/L
∗
2)
such that 0 < L∗1 < L and L
∗
2 > L.
Proposition B3: When Ψ
(
L
)
> 0, there are no (real) stationary solutions to the system
of differential equations given by (B1) and (B2).
Propositions B1-B3 are qualitatively similar to Propositions 1− 3. Moreover, using a com-
putational software is possible to show that the set of stationary solutions catalogued by Propo-
sitions B1 and B2 have the same dynamic properties of the stationary solutions analyzed in the
main text. Specifically, for
(
L,C/L
)
is not possible to retrieving local dynamics, (L∗1, C/L
∗
1)
is an unstable source whereas (L∗2, C/L
∗
2) is a saddle point. Further details are available from
the authors upon request.
Appendix: Simulating the stochastic model with a Markov
decision chain approximation
Here we examine a mathematical tool that allows to solve numerically the stochastic optimal
control problem outlined in Section 4. The approach implemented by the tool is described by
Krawczyk and Windsor (1997) and here we provide the principal ideas underlying its solution
method.
The first step is the discretization of the state-equation system using the Euler-Maruyama
approximation scheme (cf. Kloeden and Platen, 1992). Consider the following general continuous-
time form:
dX(t) = f (X(t),u(t), t) dt+ b (X(t),u(t), t) dW(t) (C4)
where X is the vector of state variables, u(t) is the vector of control variables whereas W(t) is
a Wiener process.
According to the Euler-Maruyama scheme, the approximation of (C4) in N partitions is
given by
Y = {Yl, l ∈ N, 0 ≤ l ≤ N} (C5)
The expression in (C5) has to be consistent with the following expression:
Yl+1 = Yl + f (Yl,ul, τl) (τl+1 − τl) + b (Yl,ul, τl)
(
Wτl+1 −Wτl
)
(C6)
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where l = 0, . . . , N − 1 whereas the initial seed equals to Y0 = X(0).
Thereafter, in order to determine the Markov decision process, we have to define a discrete
state space, transition probabilities for each state, as well as a reward function associated with
each transition. The discrete state space for stage l is denoted by X l whereas the extreme
values of the state grid are given by U l = max
{
X l
}
and Ll = min
{
X l
}
. Consequently, a point
x ∈ X is in the grid X l, if and only if Ll ≤ x ≤ U l. Moreover, the set of the discrete state
spaces for all stages, formally speaking
{
X l
}N
l=0
, is denoted by X. Heuristically, the adopted
numerical scheme is able to approximate a generic point of X at stage l by the points of X l
which are adjacent to it.
Having defined the discrete state space, we now move to the definition of the transition
probabilities. Consider the stochastic process in eq. (C5), i.e., Y = {Yl, l = 0, . . . , N}, where
Yl is defined by (C6). This process, although defined at discrete times, can take any real value.
For a given control sequence ul and an equidistant discretization time-steps, we can re-write
the iterative scheme of (C6) in the following abbreviated form:
Yl+1 = Yl + δfl + bl∆Wl (C7)
where fl = f (Yl,ul, τl), bl = b (Yl,ul, τl) whereas ∆Wl =Wτl+1 −Wτl .
Suppose that we are at time τl, so that Yl = Yl ∈ X l. In a deterministic context (that is,
whenever ∆Wl = 0 , l = 0, . . . , N − 1), for a given control value ul, the process moves to Yl+1,
according to eq. (C7). Consequently,
Yl+1 = Yl + δfl (C8)
If Yl+1 has only one state adjacent to it, then the transition probability from Yl is equal
to 1. By contrast, if there is a pair of states adjacent to Yl+1, called
(
Y
⊖
l+1,Y
⊕
l+1
)
, such that
hl = Y
⊕
l+1 − Y
⊖
l+1 > 0, the transition probabilities are determined according to an inverse
distance method. Formally speaking, we have
p
(
Yl,Y
⊕
l+1|ul
)
=
Yl+1−Y⊖l+1
hl
p
(
Yl,Y
⊖
l+1|ul
)
=
Y
⊕
l+1−Yl+1
hl
(C9)
In a stochastic context, a Gaussian noise is present in (C7) and, consequently, Yl+1 is no
more deterministic. In this case, we can use a partition of the realizations of the Gaussian
process ∆Wl into M steps. If we choose M = 3 and we use these intervals:
(
−∞,−√δ
)
,(
−√δ,+√δ
)
,
(
+
√
δ,+∞
)
, where
√
δ is the standard deviation of ∆Wl, then we can compute
the expected values of the noise by using the following expression:
ω =
√
2δ
√
πe
(
1− erf
(
1√
2
)) (C10)
where erf (·) is the standard error function defined by erf(t) = 2/√π ∫ t
0
e−t
2
dt.
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The transition probabilities for an approximated situation in which the process Y is per-
turbed by the discretely valued noise ωl are defined by:
P (ωl = −ω) = p−
P (ωl = 0) = p0
P (ωl = +ω) = p+
(C11)
As a result, if Yl+1 is obtained by (C7) and there is a single adjacent state, then the process
reaches l + 1 with the following probabilities:
Y−l+1 = Yl+1 + blω− with probability p−
Y0l+1 = Yl+1 with probability p0
Y+l+1 = Yl+1 + blω+ with probability p+
(C12)
By contrast, if there are two adjacent states, then it is reasonable to apply the inverse
distance method as in (C9) weighted by the proper probabilities defined in (C12). For instance,
if we considerY−l+1 with the two adjacent statesY
−⊖
l+1 andY
−⊕
l+1, then the transition probabilities
are given by
p
(
Yl,Y
−⊕
l+1|ul
)
= p−
Yl+1−Y−⊖l+1
hl
p
(
Yl,Y
−⊖
l+1|ul
)
= p−
Y
−⊕
l+1−Yl+1
hl
(C13)
where hl = Y
−⊕
l+1 −Y
−⊖
l+1 > 0.
The next phase is to assign the performance function at every transitions of the Markov
chain. The objective function to maximize must be the discretised version of the original
performance function J on the allowable controls, i.e., maxu J (0, x0;u) subject to eq. (C7).
This completes the description of the tool.
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